on a platform calling for the reversal of the Amendment, 2 and a proposal to overturn the Amendment has well over one hundred co-sponsors. 3 Following the election of Donald Trump and Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, the odds that the Hyde Amendment will be repealed have declined considerably; indeed, Trump has promised to make the Hyde Amendment a permanent law rather than an appropriations bill. 4 The amendment remains at the epicenter of abortion conflict.
For the most part, critics of the Hyde Amendment argue that it authorizes discrimination against poor women. Using original archival research, this Article argues that the impact of the Hyde Amendment has been much further reaching. Champions of the Hyde Amendment defined a right of conscience-based objection that increasingly defines conflicts over same-sex marriage, contraceptive access, and abortion. 5 During the fight for the amendment, pro-lifers refocused debate about conscience on the symbolic, rather than tangible, burden placed on believers with moral objections-a move that the-hyde-amendment-punishes-poor-women-and-its-bad-for-the-economy laid the foundation for the expansion of conscience-based arguments in later years. 6 Constitutionally, the fight for the Hyde Amendment also revamped the right-privilege distinction (or the distinction between positive and negative rights) in constitutional law. Proponents of the amendment recognized that in a series of cases about welfare benefits, the Supreme Court had viewed the distinction with skepticism. Pro-lifers tried to revive the distinction by urging the Court to focus on whether the obstacles facing a woman seeking abortion were created or controlled by the government rather than by outside forces. This approach has influenced both abortion doctrine and constitutional law more broadly.
Although the Hyde Amendment seems to be a permanent feature of the political landscape, the Court's recent decision in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt makes a challenge to the Amendment both realistic and compelling. 7 The Court explained that Casey's "undue burden" test requires a balancing of the benefits and burdens created by any abortion law, including a fetal-protective regulation. 8 As importantly, the Court's decision rejects the formalism that once defined abortion jurisprudence. 9 In determining whether a law burdens abortion, the Court looks beyond the formal terms of a law to the way it interacts with forces beyond the government's control. 10 Whole Woman's Health undermines the core premises of both the Hyde Amendment and the Supreme Court decisions upholding it.
The Court's approach to the undue burden test casts doubt on the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment and a new generation of abortion restrictions patterned on it, including bans on malpractice insurance for abortion providers, limits on private-insurance coverage for abortion, and laws defunding organizations that advocate or provide abortions. Whole Woman's Health requires a court to scrutinize the claimed benefit of an abortion regulation. Proponents of the amendment have argued that it benefits taxpayers by ensuring they are not complicit in facilitating a procedure that many find morally objectionable. 11 However, even when it comes to standing, taxpayers challenging a law need to show that they have "sustained or [are] immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally." 12 There is no proof that the Hyde Amendment protects individuals with conscience-based objections from a direct burden or injury more than any other spending measure would. Whole Woman's Health also casts the effect of the Hyde Amendment in a new light. The Court defines impermissible burdens far more broadly, dignifying the impact of delays, significant cost increases, and declines in the quality of care. 13 Moreover, Whole Woman's Health also instructs courts to stop looking at the formal terms of a law in isolation. By exploring how a law interacts with market forces, hospital policies, and individuals' economic circumstances, 14 the Court rejected the approach long used to justify the Hyde Amendment and a variety of new laws based on it.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four parts. Parts II and III trace the influence of the Hyde Amendment on key dimensions of contemporary constitutional dialogue. Part II considers how proponents of the Hyde Amendment redefined conscience-based objection, dropping any requirement for direct injury or involvement on the part of taxpayers. Part III traces the deployment of formal distinctions between positive and negative rights in the Hyde Amendment debate. Drawing on this history, Part IV reconsiders the constitutional case against the Hyde Amendment and similar laws under Whole Woman's Health, and Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE HYDE AMENDMENT AND THE REDEFINITION OF CONSCIENCE
Conscience-based objections seem to be everywhere in contemporary constitutional debate. States have introduced exemptions for cake bakers, ministers, government workers, counselors, and many others who object to same-sex marriage. 15 Conscience is at the center of attacks on the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act. 16 13. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309-10. 14. Antiabortion groups use the idea of conscience in justifying new legal restrictions, including bans on private-insurance coverage for abortion. 17 While the omnipresence of conscience arguments is new, the particular claims that now attract so much attention developed decades earlier as part of the campaign for the Hyde Amendment. The effort to ban public funding for abortion began almost before the ink had dried on the Roe v. Wade opinion. 18 To be sure, before the Hyde Amendment passed, opponents of abortion focused on a fetal-protective constitutional amendment, not a funding ban. 19 Nevertheless, between 1973 and 1976, conscience-based arguments-forged in the battle for a funding ban-became a central dimension of pro-life advocacy. At first, in state battles about funding bans, supporters primarily emphasized that nonmedical abortions fell outside the scope of Medicaid, a law designed to cover only needed health procedures.
By the mid-1970s, as this Part next demonstrates, the issue of conscience had moved to the forefront. Abortion-rights supporters prioritized a challenge to efforts on the part of Catholic hospitals to deny abortions, convincing some pro-lifers that an attack on believers' religious objections to abortion was underway. But as this Part establishes next, the ideas of conscience developed in the context of defending Catholic hospitals spread far more broadly. Pro-lifers' claims about conscience departed from the ones that had defined protest against the Vietnam War. Rather than looking at the degree of involvement a believer had, pro-lifers urged lawmakers to focus on the symbolic result of a spending bill: absent a funding ban, pro-lifers would be compelled to pay for abortion and thereby speak a message about the morality of abortion that they could not stomach. This idea of conscience has cast a lasting shadow. No matter how indirect a believer's involvement, symbolic complicity has served as a powerful tool for those seeking an exemption from otherwise applicable obligations.
A. Pro-Lifers Develop an Argument for Public-Funding Bans
Conscience-based arguments for funding bans were not initially a major part of antiabortion strategy. Indeed, in the early years after the Court's decision in Roe, abortion opponents privileged an amendment to the Constitution that would ban abortion coast to coast. 20 In spite of the movement's preoccupation with a constitutional amend- 27 and many Planned Parenthood affiliates, the leading reproductive-health provider in many locales, remained reluctant to perform abortions in the 1970s. 28 While more hospitals performed abortions in the 1970s than would be the case in later decades, 29 smaller towns served by Catholic hospitals sometimes lacked access to abortion care. 30 The application of Medicaid to abortion services also raised questions about access. sioner of Welfare Services took the position that elective abortions were "not medically indicated" and therefore not covered by the state's Medicaid program. 31 Other states and cities passed laws specifically ruling out the use of public dollars or facilities for abortion, 32 and Solicitor General Erwin Griswold took the position that Medicaid should exclude at least elective abortion. 33 In states from Utah to New Jersey, in the mid-1970s, Planned Parenthood, the ACLU, and other abortion-rights organizations challenged these laws, arguing that they violated the right to abortion recognized in Roe. 34 These early cases emphasized that under Roe, abortion already counted as a necessary medical procedure that could not be properly excluded from a state Medicaid program or prohibited in certain hospitals. 35 Moreover, according to the ACLU and Planned Parenthood, Roe had made it unconstitutional to restrict access to abortion in the first trimester, regardless of whether that restriction took the form of a direct prohibition or a funding limitation. 36 What mattered was the effect of a law. As one ACLU officer reasoned: "The combination of the only hospitals in the area refusing to perform abortions on demand, and the State's refusal to pay Medicaid for the procedure, effectively denies them the right to abortion in the first three months of pregnancy." 37 Before 1975, federal courts generally sided with supporters of abortion rights. In Doe v. Wohlgemuth, the court reasoned that Roe had already "recognized that abortion is a necessary medical service for it may prevent specific and direct harm which is medically diagnosable (e.g. psychological harm), may protect the woman's future mental and physical health, and may prevent the distress associated with the unwanted pregnancy and child." 38 Even if a Medicaid regulation covered only necessary services, abortion would qualify. 39 The court also emphasized that Roe had ruled out any regulation that interfered with a woman's abortion decision in the first trimester. 40 By putting a thumb on the scale in favor of childbirth, the State had crossed a line. 41 Other courts looked to the Equal Protection Clause in striking down funding bans, relying on a line of cases involving welfare and the right to travel. 42 "Once the state has undertaken to provide general short-term hospital care," one court explained, "it may not constitutionally draw the line at medically indistinguishable surgical procedures that impinge on fundamental rights." 43 Heartened by these results, the ACLU distributed a handbook on how to sue both public and private hospitals, including those with religious objections to abortion. 44 When it came to private hospitals, the organization insisted that Catholic hospitals should be treated as state actors because they had assumed powers of the public hospitals and accepted so much aid from the government, including tax exemptions and federal funding. 45 The threat of an attack on Catholic health care providers prompted pro-lifers to refine conscience arguments. Eugene Schultz, the director of legal services of the Catholic Hospital Association, warned his members that the ACLU was working to force them to perform abortions against their conscience. 46 At first, movement members primarily made these arguments in court. 47 A New Jersey trial judge sympathetic to pro-lifers ruled that no hospital should be forced to violate the conscience of its physicians. 48 Requiring a hospital "to act contrary to the community conscience, as well as the conscience of its management, would itself be contrary to the public good," opined Superior Court Judge Herbert Horne in the mid-1970s. 49 However, as pro-lifers defended new restrictions on Medicaid funding, they began pointing to an expanded idea of conscience, one that included not only hospitals but rather any taxpayer. In Congress, in September 1974, the Senate passed an appropriations bill sponsored by Senator Dewey Bartlett (R-OK) that banned the Medicaid funding of abortion unless a woman's life was in danger. 51 Bartlett initially presented a Medicaid funding ban as a way for members of Congress to express their own religious or moral beliefs. 52 "Each member of Congress must decide for himself whether or not permitting the use of federal funds for abortions aids in the taking of a human life." 53 Later, pro-life state legislators began presenting themselves as champions of the conscience of taxpayers. 54 As one explained: "[T]axpayers who believe that abortion-on-request is a crime against humanity . . . should not be compelled to become unwilling accessories to these self-avowed, private, personal acts of abortion, which are grossly offensive to their social consciences." 55
B. More Complex Conscience Arguments Emerge
In April 1975, when the Bartlett Amendment failed by a vote of fifty-four to thirty-six, pro-lifers recognized the need for more elaborate arguments about conscience. 56 Opponents of the bill, including Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), argued that it would discriminate against poor women, denying them abortion rights that everyone else could exercise. 57 Others insisted that the bill was vague, potentially covering some forms of contraception, including intrauterine devices. 58 Still others, including Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY), presented Bartlett's proposal as the beginning of an incremental attack on Roe. 59 Senator John Pastore (D-RI) raised the issue of conscience in a last-ditch attempt to save Bartlett's plan. 60 Pastore's argument offered the beginnings of an approach that antiabortion activists would develop in the next two years. He tried to draw the conversation away from the degree of involvement that taxpayers would have in an abortion. Instead, he emphasized the expressive function of money, describing it as a form of speech. By spending taxpayer money in a way of which some would strongly disapprove, Congress would act in flagrant violation of the moral beliefs of voters.
Over the course of the next several years, members of NRLC refined this idea of conscience. Reverend Phillip Reilly, an NRLC member, wrote the Internal Revenue Service that he had deducted from his taxes an amount that he believed would reflect his support of abortion funding. 62 Dexter Duggan, another NRLC leader, elaborated much more on Reilly's theory. 63 In a letter to National Right to Life News in the mid-1970s, Duggan laid out a theory that other abortion opponents could use. 64 The principle of freedom of conscience underlying Roe, Duggan argued, should mean that a funding ban was necessary as well as just. 65 "We hear frequently about freedom of choice for abortion," he wrote. 66 "So I must conclude that there should be freedom of choice not to be forced to pay for this repugnant practice of permissive abortions." 67 To be sure, the principle of freedom of conscience was the same: people should have the freedom to make important decisions without government compulsion. However, Duggan ignored potentially important distinctions between the two situations. Women forced to bear children against their will faced serious consequences, some of them highlighted by the Roe Court, including the physical impact of pregnancy and childbirth. The burden on Duggan and other taxpayers was far less grave in financial, physical, or emotional terms. Second, the degree of complicity or involvement on the part of the objecting individual distinguished taxpayers and women seeking an abortion. Taxpayers did not have to receive or perform abortions. Nor did taxpayers literally put the money to pay for an abortion in women's hands; the government acted as an intermediary. Nevertheless, in Duggan's view, the idea of conscience carried equal weight in both scenarios. The analogy Duggan drew suggested that conscience as a constitutional principle required absolute neutrality on the part of the government. 68 "We also hear that the U.S. Supreme Court did not make abortion mandatory," he explained. 69 "So it seems obvious that neither should it be mandatory for U.S. citizens to have to pay for this callous, inhumane practices through their tax dollars." 70 As Duggan saw it, Roe relied on the abstract importance of liberty in important decisions and the constitutional problems with governmental coercion. 71 When it came to taxpayer funding, the Constitution and public policy should always favor those seeking freedom from coercion. 72 Duggan recognized that his analogy was not perfect, explaining that the federal taxing power "sanitized" pro-lifers' involvement. 73 Nevertheless, because of the expressive power of money, he insisted that the injury suffered by objecting taxpayers was as serious as any other. 74 Forcing those with moral objections to pay for something against their conscience made these abortion opponents look "stupid and not deeply committed . . . [or] like utter hypocrites." 75 In 1976, when Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL) presented a rider to an appropriations bill, these ideas of conscience became an important part of the debate. Senator Pastore again picked up on the idea of conscience honed by activists like Duggan. 76 "[W]hat we are actually doing here is sanctifying with public money something that other people morally have an objection to," he argued. 77 Opponents of Hyde's proposal noted that antiabortion lawmakers wanted an exemption for taxpayers that would not extend to others with equally forceful objections to government spending. 78 Senator Robert Packwood (R-OR) also pressed Pastore on the similarities between those who objected to the Vietnam War and those who opposed Medicaid funding for abortion. 80 Pastore insisted that the Hyde Amendment was different, and his colleagues emphasized that abortion took the life of an innocent who was not an enemy combatant or hostile party. 81 Nevertheless, Packwood and Bayh spotlighted one of the ways in which the Hyde Amendment reconceptualized conscience. The Amendment defined a form of complicity based on the symbolic value of money. Taxpayers forced to contribute to a practice that they found abhorrent were in some way compelled to speak in favor of that practice. But in addition to broadening the definition of conscience, prolifers also called for an exemption asserting that objection to abortion was different from and more legitimate than other forms of protest, including opposition to the Vietnam War. In reassuring members of Congress that the Hyde Amendment would not lead to exemptions for other objecting taxpayers, lawmakers and antiabortion activists suggested that moral opposition to the taking of innocent fetal life was entitled to more deference than other forms of dissent would be.
Other members of Congress argued that the Hyde Amendment looked only at the burdens imposed on those objecting to abortions. 82 Representative Herman Badillo (D-NY) argued that the law would impose the beliefs of one group of Americans on everyone else. 83 The Amendment ignored the burdens placed on women who wished to have abortions, providers who would have to bear higher costs, Americans who disagreed with Hyde's view of the moral stakes of the abortion question, and even taxpayers with moral objections to other policies that the rider suggested deserved less weight than those embodied in the Hyde Amendment. 84 Nevertheless, supporters of the bill had a clear, simple idea of conscience that resonated with members of Congress. 85 "We are talking here about the right of the people, because of their religious and moral beliefs, do [sic] not support the taking the life of a human being," explained one supportive member. 86 Following the passage of the Hyde Amendment, President Gerald Ford approved of the idea of a Medicaid funding ban but nevertheless vetoed the appropriations bill for reasons of "fiscal integrity." 87 Ulti- mately, Congress overrode the veto, and some members opposed to the Amendment joined the override effort. 88 The reasons for the initial success of the Amendment were complex. Arguments about discrimination against poor women rang hollow at a time when hostility to broad welfare programs was intensifying. 89 Furthermore, many opponents of the Hyde Amendment believed that the courts would strike down the rider, leaving intact parts of the appropriations bill of which they approved. 90 In the 1970s and beyond, the political appeal of the Hyde Amendment seemed clear. The idea of conscience appealed to a large cross section of voters and politicians, particularly when moral objections intersected with anger about the size and cost of the welfare state. Proponents of the Amendment also successfully made conscience into a far more effective weapon. Antiwar protestors and other conscientious objectors had had to justify their protest by foregrounding the degree of involvement the draft would require. Champions of the Hyde Amendment made no effort to justify taxpayers' objections on the same grounds. Taxpayers were complicit enough in abortions simply by virtue of the message sent by allowing their dollars to pay for abortions, however indirectly.
Proponents of the Hyde Amendment also suggested that some forms of conscience-based objection deserved more support than others. By prioritizing the rights of the innocent, pro-lifers claimed a form of conscience-based protest that could be easily distinguished from other objections raised by taxpayers. The Amendment set the stage for later efforts to explain how conscience-based protest should trump other governmental interests or even constitutional liberties.
C. Conscience Arguments Multiply
In the years since the Hyde Amendment, conscience-based exemptions have spread rapidly. After Oregon legalized a limited form of physician-assisted suicide in 1997, the State passed a consciencebased protection for physicians who did not want to participate in the 88 procedure. 91 Another battle about the expanding boundaries of conscience came in the context of abortion when a pharmacist was fired for refusing to sell Plan B, an emergency contraceptive. 92 Marketed as Plan B or Preven, the emergency contraceptive had been for sale since 1998, and sales averaged twelve to fifteen million dollars in the earlyto mid-2000s. 93 Controversy about the pill grew in January 2004 when the Eckerd chain of pharmacies in Texas terminated a pharmacist who refused to prescribe the drug to a rape victim because he believed that it caused an abortion by preventing a fertilized egg from implanting in the uterus. 94 The firing made legislation protecting pharmacists' consciencebased objections a priority for abortion opponents. 95 After South Dakota passed such a law, five other states considered doing the same. 96 While no two bills were identical, most shielded pharmacists from legal liability or loss of their jobs because they refused to prescribe Plan B for reasons of conscience. 97 Some laws went further, protecting those who refused to prescribe the birth-control pill. 98 "Pharmacists are now on the front line of the abortion issue," stated Denise Burke of Americans United for Life (AUL). 99 "No one should ever be put in the position where they have to violate their conscience or risk losing their job." 100 By the following year, pro-lifers began championing an approach whereby pharmacists neither filled prescriptions themselves nor took steps to ensure that customers could receive help elsewhere. 101 pharmacists even took custody of prescriptions and refused to transfer them to another facility. 102 While the FDA continued to refuse to address whether Plan B should be available without a prescription, states scrambled to pass laws either expanding or restricting access to the drug. 103 The "conscience clauses" still written into pharmacist-protection laws drew on the strategy forged during the Hyde Amendment. Unlike doctors who performed abortions themselves, pharmacists did not directly terminate any pregnancy, even if Plan B was properly considered an abortifacient. For some time, women required a physician's prescription, and even in later years, women retained the ultimate decision to take the drug.
However, the idea of the conscience that developed during the fight for the Hyde Amendment took the spotlight off the degree of complicity required by an objector. Some pharmacists borrowed from the idea that participating in an immoral or offensive act harmed an objector because it sent a message that the objector agreed with the act. 104 "I believe you have a right not to fill a prescription if you think it will harm the patient or the unborn child," reasoned one pharmacist in 2004. 105 Like champions of the Hyde Amendment, supporters of pharmacist-protection acts also effectively argued that the only burdens that mattered were those affecting the objector. Women who refused Plan B prescriptions clearly faced concrete harms under certain circumstances. The drug worked only when taken within seventy-two hours after unprotected sex. 106 When pharmacists refused to fill a prescription, the window closed for many women, forcing them to consider more invasive abortion procedures or carrying a potential pregnancy to term. 107 Supporters of the pharmacist-protection laws effectively argued that burdens on moral and religious objectors were different and more deserving of deference, particularly when opposition to abortion was involved. 108 [Vol. 96:577
The most visible conscience-based demands arguably now apply in the context of same-sex marriage and abortion. Starting in 2009, religious conservatives and abortion opponents used the idea of conscience to explain the connection between the two issues. 109 The 2009 Manhattan Declaration, a manifesto endorsed by Catholic and evangelicalProtestant religious leaders and conservative activists, set forth three principles uniting conservatives with otherwise disparate aims: "the sanctity of human life, the dignity of marriage as a union of husband and wife, and the freedom of conscience and religion." 110 Since 2009, in the courts and legislatures, organizations sympathetic to the aims of the Manhattan Declaration made no effort to hide their efforts to expand the idea of conscience. AUL's model legislation, the Health Care Freedom of Conscience Act, describes the "basic civil right the right of all health care providers, institutions, and payers to decline to counsel, advise, pay for, provide, perform, assist, or participate in providing or performing health care services that violate their consciences." 111 The bill, already on the books in several states, would expand on pharmacist-protection bills by reaching a wide variety of actors, including social workers, counselors, and students only peripherally involved in health care delivery. 112 The bill also explicitly expands the right not to pay for services to which one objects, protecting a class of "health care payers" that includes "health maintenance organizations, health plans, insurance companies, or management services organizations." 113 The Act would protect conscience by excusing objectors from legal liability and requiring the government to ignore purported protected acts in the allotting of grants and other forms of aid. 114 The Health Care Freedom of Conscience Act draws on a vision of conscience that first emerged in the battle for the Hyde Amendment. For supporters of the Hyde Amendment, the degree of involvement in a supposedly objectionable act no longer matters if an objector finds a request offensive. Antiabortion taxpayers argued for the Hyde Amendment because the use of their tax money, in their view, sent an unacceptable message about pro-lifers' sincerity, credibility, and beliefs. AUL's model law would similarly protect anyone who feels that her conscience has been violated, regardless of what she is asked to do.
AUL also describes the relevant burdens in conscience analysis as the ones impacting religious or moral objectors. The introduction to AUL's 2011 model law equates an effort to "eviscerate conscience" with the "concerted campaign to force hospitals, health care institutions, health insurers, and individual health care providers to provide, refer, and pay for abortions." 115 Those burdened by a refusal to provide health care services, including patients, do not fall under this definition of conscience-nor, as was the case with the Hyde Amendment, do those who object to the kind of religious or moral beliefs defended by the Act.
The conscience claims raised in challenging the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act or same-sex marriage draw on a similar logic. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to the contraceptive mandate raised under the federal Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA), a federal statute restoring the more exacting constitutional test for cases involving the free exercise of religion that the Supreme Court discarded in 1990. 116 Conservative and religious organizations supporting the challenge built on the case made for the Hyde Amendment's protection of conscience, describing the degree of direct involvement as irrelevant and privileging the conscience-based objections of some believers over others. 117 One brief signed by the authors of the Manhattan Declaration and other religious and conservative groups made the common claim that "[t]he theological requirement that Christians comply with scriptural commands in their occupation prohibits not only direct and personal wrongdoing, but also the enabling, authorizing, or aiding of another in doing what the Christian believes to be sin." 118 Similar arguments figured centrally in Zubik v. Burwell, the most recent challenge to the contraceptive mandate. 120 Zubik involved a challenge to the "accommodation" provision of the Affordable Care Act regulations, which created an exemption for those with religious objections. 121 To get the accommodation, organizations had to fill out a form detailing their objections and provide a copy to an insurer or third-party administrator. 122 The challengers argued that the accommodation requirements created a substantial burden under RFRA, again using an idea of conscience with roots in the Hyde Amendment debate. 123 As one brief explained: "The courts, like the legislatures, recognize that one's religious beliefs may prevent believers from any attenuated authorization or complicity in conduct they consider to be wrong." 124 Protests against the Supreme Court's decision legalizing same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges have also adopted a broad understanding of conscience. Consider the example of Mississippi's HB 1523, the Protecting Conscience from Government Discrimination Act. 125 The bill enumerates three beliefs entitled to protection: those involving the superiority of heterosexual marriage, the immorality of nonmarital sex, and the illegitimacy of gender identities based on anything other than "immutable biological sex." 126 The law covers those performing same-sex marriages, employers, public accommodations, counselors, adoption agencies, and a variety of other actors, protecting them against discrimination, a term defined to include almost any tax or benefit implication. 127 Just as was the case with the Hyde Amendment, the bill elevates some conscience-based objections over others and ignores the degree of involvement required of objectors. 128 The Hyde Amendment struggle gave rise to a vision of conscience that has influenced political struggles ever since. It is worth noting how much this idea departed from the one that was arguably the most familiar at the time that Congress passed the Hyde Amendment. the bill suggested that those with contravening views "hold disfavored, minority beliefs" while privileging those who agree with section 2 and granting them "a broad array of special legal immunities").
on the scope of the conscientious-objector exemption of the Universal Military Training Service Act. 129 The first case, United States v. Seeger, expanded the exemption to cover objectors who did not believe in God in any orthodox sense. 130 In a second case, United States v. Welsh, the Court included those with ethical convictions that an objector held with the same conviction that a believer would maintain for religious beliefs. 131 The Welsh Court also emphasized the degree of involvement that war would require of conscientious objectors. 132 Welsh had refused participation in the war because he "believe[d] the taking of life-anyone's life-to be morally wrong." 133 The Court reasoned that denying Welsh an exemption would require him to act in direct violation of his beliefs, forcing him to become "an instrument of war." 134 However, the Court refused to broaden the exemption further. In Gillette v. United States, the Court rejected the claim of objectors opposed to the war in Vietnam rather than to all wars. 135 While the Court relied primarily on the text and legislative history of the challenged statute, the majority also spotlighted the burdens that any exemption created for third parties. 136 The Gillette Court suggested that any conscience-based objection should involve a balancing of the beliefs of the objector, the threat that "the binding quality of democratic decisions" would be jeopardized, and the fortunes of those with other reasons for going to war or refusing to do so. 137 Privileging the conscience of some objectors raised the possibility that "those who go to war [would be] chosen unfairly or capriciously." 138 The supporters of the Hyde Amendment defined conscience far more broadly. Pro-lifers first sought to excuse those only remotely involved in behavior that they found objectionable. Movement leaders also dismissed the concerns of those harmed by an exemption, including those with different ideas of conscience and those who benefitted from the enforcement of a law about which objectors complained. Finally, champions of the law suggested that it was reasonable to attach more value to some objections than others. All of these moves became a fundamental part of the political and legal argument for conscience that has become a familiar feature of political and constitutional debate. As Part III shows, the fight for the Hyde Amendment also helped to shape the constitutional distinction between a right and a privilege. Antiabortion attorneys distraught about the Roe decision began looking for a way to narrow its reach. In the funding context, AUL attorneys seized on the idea that Roe had recognized a right to privacy. Emphasizing that privacy involved freedom from state interference, AUL lawyers argued that the Constitution had nothing to do with whether women could actually exercise their abortion rights. The organization promoted a kind of abortion-law formalism that ultimately changed the direction of the Court's jurisprudence.
While the right-privilege distinction casts a shadow over much of constitutional law, the benefit-burden distinction pushed by AUL influenced both the Supreme Court's decisions on state and federal funding bans and on every dimension of abortion law. As Part III shows, the Hyde Amendment set the stage for the adoption of a formalist approach that has distorted abortion law and other aspects of constitutional law ever since.
III. THE HYDE AMENDMENT AND THE REVIVAL OF THE RIGHT-PRIVILEGE DISTINCTION
The Court's decisions in Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae help to reinvigorate the right-privilege distinction in constitutional law. 139 Introduced in the nineteenth century, the distinction suggests that a law raises constitutional problems only when the government uses coercive force. 140 In practical terms, however, the distinction has long seemed problematic, particularly when the "government . . . more often exerts its power by withholding benefits than by threatening bodily harm." 141 In the 1960s and 1970s, under pressure from critics, the right-privilege distinction became increasingly fragile. 142 riod, the Supreme Court no longer took for granted that the government's power to impose conditions on the receipt of benefits had no constitutional limits. 143 Indeed, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court invalidated most limits on benefits under the Aid to Families and Dependent Children (AFDC) Program. 144 Following the decision of Maher, however, the Court began turning away most challenges to laws on welfare benefits. 145 In the aftermath of Maher and Harris, the Court increasingly presumed the constitutionality of laws that merely denied a benefit. 146 These cases helped to revive and legitimize the right-privilege distinction, creating a doctrinal approach that the Court has applied in a variety of arenas. This Part explores the legal strategy abortion opponents used to restore a strong right-privilege distinction in constitutional law. In the mid-1970s, antiabortion attorneys concerned about the mainstream movement's reliance on a constitutional amendment began searching for a litigation strategy that could help advance their cause. Prior to Roe, lawyers had made the same fetal-rights arguments inside and outside of court, asserting that the Constitution recognized implied fundamental rights for unborn children. Convinced that this tactic had reached a dead end, AUL attorneys next worked to convince the Court that Roe permitted at least some restrictions on abortion. At first, this approach was scattershot, focusing almost entirely on the benefits supposedly achieved by individual regulations. For these at- torneys, however, the funding cases offered an important opportunity for the movement to create a master theory of abortion rights-one that would allow activists to defend most regulations and delegitimize Roe in the process. As this Part shows next, in creating a more coherent plan of attack, antiabortion attorneys reinvented the right-privilege distinction. Without defending its pedigree in every case, antiabortion attorneys argued that at a minimum, the distinction had analytical force when applied to certain kinds of rights, especially those described as privacy interests. Focusing on the kind of right at issue in a case promised a much more modest change in constitutional law. At least superficially, the strategy also seemed more analytically rigorous than a superficial examination of whether a law involved a sanction or a benefit, which required courts to explore the nature of the constitutional interest in question.
This argument paid off in Maher and Harris. The Court reconceptualized the abortion right and constitutional privacy more broadly as pure freedoms from state interference. In this context, the Court also reintroduced a formal distinction between laws that burdened a constitutional interest and those that did not. Without much explanation of what a burden entailed or how one could be identified, the Court relied on the right-privilege distinction in evaluating abortion regulations.
Moreover, Harris and Maher offered a workable approach for courts seeking to distinguish negative and positive rights. Borrowing from the arguments of abortion opponents, the Court argued that a law did not burden constitutional rights if it had the practical effect of putting those rights off limits unless the state created or controlled the obstacles in an individual's way. This approach has resonated well beyond the abortion context.
A. Pro-Lifers Look for a New Litigation Strategy
In the later 1970s, when antiabortion attorneys began work on the funding cases, the future of the right-privilege distinction seemed anything but certain. 147 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court rejected an argument that welfare benefits were a privilege rather than a right and held that certain procedural protections had to be in place before benefits were denied. 148 The Court consistently overturned limits on AFDC benefits for much of the 1960s and early 1970s. 149 The antiabortion movement also saw little reason to be hopeful about the potential of litigation. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many movement lawyers had remained confident that the courts would recognize constitutional fetal rights if presented with the right evidence. 150 Martin McKernan, the head of the NRLC legal team, advised movement attorneys to play to their strengths-highlighting ultrasounds and other scientific evidence supporting the idea of fetal personhood and leveraging the recognition of fetal rights in contract, tort, and property law. 151 McKernan explained:
All in all, the law has consistently established certain procedural safeguards around fundamental rights to which the unborn was entitled. That most fundamental of rights-not to be deprived of life without due process of the lawcannot be ignored. However, these arguments must be demonstrated to any court . . . through the intervention of interested state right-to-life groups. In one federal court challenge to a state abortion statute a doctor was allowed to enter the case as an intervenor on behalf of all unborn children in that state. 152 As McKernan's comments suggested, prior to Roe, abortion opponents pursued a litigation strategy that closely tracked activists' political arguments about fetal humanity and fetal rights. 153 NRLC popularized slideshows of abortion to spread the movement's arguments about fetal personhood and the violence of abortion. 154 Both AUL and NRLC tied these images to an implied constitutional right that abortion opponents identified in the Declaration of Independence and the Fourteenth Amendment. 155 Litigators looked to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses as vehicles for this idea of fetal life. To establish that the fetus deserved equal protection of the laws, movement lawyers hoped to demonstrate that "the unborn child [would] qualify as a person within the purview" of the Fourteenth Amendment. 156 The medical claims and fetal images that the movement had popularized in the political arena could convince judges "factually that abortion destroys an individuated and unique human life." 157 tific proof, movement lawyers planned to establish that "the unborn child is a human being and it is difficult to conceive of a human being who is not a person." 158 The movement's procedural due process strategy similarly relied on medical reasoning about fetal life. Movement attorneys like David Louisell argued that the unborn child could not be deprived of life without due process of law. 159 Again, this strategy attracted support because it allowed pro-lifers to draw on what they saw as scientific evidence of fetal personhood. 160 A month after the Court decided Roe, NRLC affiliates went to work proposing laws that could limit the reach of the decision. 161 While activists invested some energy in the effort to "spell out at the local level . . . what the intention of the Supreme Court is," most abortion opponents believed that litigation would do very little good. 162 "[O]ne does not have to be a trained lawyer to recognize that increasingly 'the Constitution is what judges say it is,' " complained one antiabortion group in 1973. 163 While the Court seemed unreceptive to any antiabortion argument, the problem for the movement went further. The legal strategies that antiabortion lawyers had been honing for decades had failed in the Court. It was not obvious what movement lawyers should do next.
Nevertheless, Dennis Horan, an AUL leader, worried that the movement had placed too much hope in an Article V constitutional amendment. 164 Horan and some of his colleagues recognized that such an amendment would be hard to pass. 165 Moreover, Horan understood that even if abortion opponents managed to introduce a successful constitutional amendment, the courts would have the power to interpret it. 166 As a result, Horan argued for the usefulness of "a National Public Interest law firm, which would provide a spearhead for litigation toward the ultimate goal of reversing Roe v. Wade AUL still built on existing strategies, insisting that Roe allowed for at least some regulations of abortion. 172 Consider, for example, the organization's analysis of the Missouri informed-consent regulation. 173 The AUL brief suggested that Roe had already limited abortion rights in a way that allowed the state to require women to sign an informed-consent form. 174 "In enunciating some of the factors the doctor will necessarily consider in consultation with the woman contemplating an abortion, the court further regulated the physician's right to practice medicine in a way he might see fit," AUL argued. 175 "Thus it may be seen that Roe v. Wade teaches that the right to practice medicine, just as any other right, is a limited one at best." 176 While AUL argued that Roe allowed Missouri to pass all of the challenged restrictions, the justification for each one was unique. When defending a parental-consent restriction, AUL lawyers stressed that Missouri law had already mandated the consent of a parent before minors could get an abortion. 177 The AUL brief argued that for this reason, the state law added no "extra layer of regulation" and placed no further burden on young women seeking an abortion. 178 The brief identified an entirely different rationale for a spousal-consent regulation. 179 "The state thus purports to find a sufficient compelling interest in the integrity of marriage and family life to preclude unconsented abortion where the life of the wife is not endangered," the brief 168 reasoned. 180 "To protect this interest, the state acknowledges a joint interest and power of disposition of the married parties in their unborn child." 181 Danforth was not a complete loss for AUL. The Court upheld Missouri's informed-consent law and took seriously the State's arguments in favor of other regulations, including limited access to abortion in the first trimester. 182 Nevertheless, the problems with AUL's strategy in the case seemed evident. Much of the organization's brief foregrounded the need to overrule Roe altogether. 183 Danforth made it apparent that the Court was unwilling to reconsider Roe at any point in the near future. 184 Moreover, when rationalizing each individual regulation, AUL attorneys had assumed for the sake of argument that the Court viewed abortion as a fundamental right. 185 While arguing that there was a compelling state purpose behind every part of the law, the brief conceded that strict scrutiny applied to every abortion regulation because of Roe. 186 AUL began developing a more comprehensive plan when the group became involved in a series of funding cases. Maher v. Roe, the lead case, addressed the constitutionality of a Connecticut ban on Medicaid funding for most abortions. 187 Poelker v. Doe concerned a St. Louis law prohibiting the use of public hospitals for abortions. 188 Beal v. Doe, the third of the series, asked whether compliance with the federal Social Security Act required Pennsylvania's Medicaid program to cover nontherapeutic abortions. 189 Working with state and local governments defending their own restrictions, AUL developed a new approach focused on the nature of the right at issue in Roe. First, AUL's brief in Poelker separated the right to make decisions about abortion-an interest that the organization admitted was protected under Roe-from the ability to actually obtain an abortion. 190 AUL argued that because Roe dealt with a woman's decisional autonomy, "the abortional act . . . enjoys no constitutional protection in itself." 191 AUL attorneys also emphasized the fact that Roe had described the decision to have an abortion as a matter of constitutional privacy. Here, AUL borrowed from arguments for government neutrality made in the context of the Hyde Amendment. 192 If abortion involved freedom from government interference, state governments and physicians with objections to abortion should have been free from compulsion to help women have abortions. 193 A right to choose abortion meant that women could expect nothing from the government but neutral treatment. 194 "If the abortion decision is so private," AUL argued, "it follows that government shall not itself be compelled to respond to the demand of the exercise of that right." 195 Working with AUL, the State of Connecticut reinforced this idea of privacy rights, arguing that it provided a window into the nature of all constitutional protections. 196 Connecticut distinguished Maher from a series of earlier cases involving the right to travel, many of which had served as the foundation for abortion-rights victories in the lower courts. 197 First, Connecticut argued that the Court had never recognized a right to effectuate a constitutionally protected decision. 198 Instead, at most, the Court had censured states for discriminating against protected decisions or acts. 199 Connecticut claimed that any such discrimination was lacking in Maher: the state had chosen to fund all medically necessary services, and elective abortion, like many other treatments, fell outside the scope of coverage. 200 Connecticut made a more influential argument that built on the logic of AUL's privacy reasoning. The State argued that the Constitution prohibited only laws that restricted or burdened constitutional rights. 201 Returning to the right-to-travel cases, Connecticut reinterpreted the Court's jurisprudence. 202 The Court had decided a trio of cases that had convinced some that funding restrictions could be unconstitutional. 203 Court held that Tennessee may not burden the right to travel by imposing a durational residency requirement of one year in the state and three months in the county in order to be eligible to vote. 206 Connecticut argued that the Court had never departed from a formal distinction between laws restricting action and laws providing benefits. 207 The durational residency requirements in Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County violated the Constitution because they prevented the plaintiffs "from receiving nonemergency medical care, . . . public welfare benefits, . . . [or] the right to vote." 208 Because the Connecticut law neither created nor controlled such a burden, it was constitutional. 209 "There is nothing in the Connecticut regulation which prevents a woman from making a choice to have an abortion," Connecticut insisted. 210 In June 1977, the Court issued a decision in Maher, and AUL attorneys concluded that their new approach to Roe had made progress. 211 When it came to the nature of the constitutional interest in Roe, the Court emphasized that the Constitution guarded against "governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and criminal prohibition of certain activities." 212 The Court seemed to accept AUL's argument that Roe involved only the freedom to make a decision, not the ability to effectuate any choice. 213 As the Maher Court put it, "the right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." 214 The Court also adopted the formalist approach proposed by Connecticut. 215 "There is a basic difference," the Court explained, "between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity." 216 tion the limits of the constitutional approach announced in Maher and its companion cases. First, the Connecticut regulation in Maher was arguably distinguishable from the Hyde Amendment: while Connecticut excluded only elective abortions from coverage, the Hyde Amendment denied payment for all but a handful of medically necessary abortions. 217 Those challenging the Hyde Amendment argued that for this reason, the rider created an unconstitutional burden. 218 However, the ACLU and its allies also rejected formalism and asked the Court to look at the purpose of the Hyde Amendment and its effect on poor women. 219 "[T]he ultimate test of whether constitutionally protected interests are being impinged upon," the appellees argued, "is not simply the form that the state interference takes but the effect." 220 Those challenging the Hyde Amendment also responded to the complicity-based idea of conscience so effectively deployed by pro-lifers. 221 "The Hyde Amendment . . . destroy[s] not only the guarantee of comprehensive medical care for the poor, but also the universal guarantee of liberty of conscience," explained the ACLU brief challenging the amendment. 222 In the ACLU's analysis, Medicaid equally respected the beliefs of those who objected to abortion and those for whom "conscience may dictate the necessity of terminating an unwanted and health-threatening pregnancy." 223 True neutrality required the government not to take sides rather than favoring those who identified as pro-life. 224 Those challenging the Hyde Amendment argued that the rider thus violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, heavily burdening the religious liberty of women who believed that an abortion was morally or religiously compelled. 225 Moreover, the ACLU argued that because the Hyde Amendment privileged some consciencebased beliefs over others, the rider violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment:
B. The Court Considers the Constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment
[T]he absence of clearly secular advocacy in the "right to life" movement for the abortion restrictions is decisive. Its constituency, support and orientation are largely religious and, more importantly, it asserts no independent secular justification for the evils of abortion. Where legislation rooted in sectarian religious beliefs not widely shared is claimed to serve a secular purpose, and is supported in the legislature and in the society at large by a predominantly and pervasively religious constituency, the claim of secular purpose must fail. 226 Those defending the Hyde Amendment not only had to answer these arguments but also had to justify the Maher Court's formalist turn. Some lawyers fell back on the separation of powers, arguing that the courts should not second-guess Congress's exercise of its appropriation powers. 227 Intervening on behalf of Representative Hyde and other federal defendants, AUL doubled down on the right-privilege distinction that the organization had emphasized in Maher, insisting that it made no difference whether the Amendment denied funding for medically necessary procedures. 228 "This is neither an 'abortion case' nor a right to privacy case," AUL reasoned. 229 "This case does not involve any substantive constitutional rights of persons; it involves appropriations made by the Congress for use in an economic and social welfare program." 230 AUL maintained that all constitutional protections, including privacy, were " 'non-interference' rights-freedoms or immunities from governmental restraint or interference." 231 If a law addressed a benefit rather than a burden, the Constitution should play no role in the analysis. 232 AUL also defended the vision of conscience that abortion opponents had developed during the fight for the Hyde Amendment. First, the organization argued that it was fair to privilege the conscience-based beliefs of some over those of others because the Free Exercise Clause would sweep far too broadly without any kind of limiting principle. 233 AUL argued that if women felt compelled by conscience to terminate a pregnancy, that should not matter unless their beliefs were "mandated by specific and affirmative corporate tenets of some religious group." 234 Moreover, even if women had a religious objection to carrying a pregnancy to term, the government still had no obligation to pay for anything. 235 A constitutional right at most prevented the government from burdening a woman's decision. 236 Harris embraced AUL's argument. First, the Court concluded that it made no difference that the Amendment excluded both therapeutic and nontherapeutic abortions. 237 the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom," the Court concluded. 238 When it came to the Free Exercise Clause, the Court found that none of those challenging the Hyde Amendment had standing to raise the issue because none of them had sought an abortion for reasons of religious compulsion. 239 Nor did the Court believe that the Hyde Amendment violated the Establishment Clause. 240 Rejecting the idea that antiabortion beliefs were necessarily religious or sectarian, the Court reasoned that the Amendment represented "a reflection of 'traditionalist' values towards abortion, as much as it is an embodiment of the views of any particular religion." 241 Harris became a foundational part of the Court's right-privilege canon, bolstering the idea that only constitutional "burdens" triggered meaningful judicial scrutiny. The Court's decision serves as a reminder of how the Hyde Amendment continues to shape contemporary constitutional politics.
If there is no doubt about the ongoing relevance of the Hyde Amendment, the fate of any challenge to it remains open to question. Efforts to challenge the Amendment have fallen short before. 242 The Supreme Court has never shown any willingness to reconsider Maher or Harris. In the 1990s, when Bill Clinton had pro-choice majorities in both houses of Congress, Clinton's effort to overturn the Amendment failed. 243 In today's sharply partisan climate, 244 the hope for any challenge to the Hyde Amendment may be just as dim.
However, as Part IV argues, Whole Woman's Health provides crucial new tools for challenging the Hyde Amendment. Part IV turns next to the implications of the Court's decision for the Hyde Amendment and the arguments underlying it. 
IV. THE HYDE AMENDMENT AFTER WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH
The precise impact of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Whole Woman's Health remains contested. This Part argues that the Court's decision means something significant for the Hyde Amendment and for the right-privilege distinction. Without formally abandoning the idea of a line between burdens and benefits, the Court rejected the basic method used in Maher and Harris to draw that distinction. After Whole Woman's Health, it no longer matters whether the government exclusively controls and creates a disputed burden if it means that women lose access to have an abortion.
This Part begins with an exploration of the background and holding of Whole Woman's Health. Next, this Part shows how the Court's decision makes a challenge to the Hyde Amendment more realistic and compelling.
A. Whole Woman's Health Redefines the Undue Burden Test
Whole Woman's Health involved two parts of Texas's HB 2, a law requiring doctors performing abortions to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles and a measure mandating that abortion clinics comply with the regulations governing ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs). 245 However, the strategy underlying HB 2 went much further. For much of the 1970s and the 1980s, abortion opponents had prioritized fetal-protective laws and arguments, but after 1992, the movement's focus shifted to laws claimed to harm both women and fetal life. 246 Moreover, Casey itself seemed to signal the Court's receptiveness to woman-protective arguments. 247 The Court's 1992 decision declined an invitation to overrule Roe but set aside the trimester framework that had governed earlier abortion cases. 248 In its place, Casey imposed the undue burden test, a standard that required the invalidation of any regulation that had the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's abortion decision. 249 Court upheld an informed-consent regulation, using language that echoed abortion opponents' claims that abortion hurt women. 250 "In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision," the Court stated, "the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed." 251 Casey energized abortion opponents committed to arguing that abortion hurt women. 252 Abortion opponents first expanded on the mandated-counseling model upheld in Casey. 253 While Casey said nothing about the regulation of abortion clinics, abortion opponents also wanted to push laws designed to protect women's physical and mental health. 254 Targeted-clinic regulations like HB 2 were advertised as a way of guaranteeing women a higher quality of care and putting substandard providers out of business. 255 Texas lawmakers patterned HB 2 on the Women's Health Protection Act and the Abortion Providers Privileging Act, model laws crafted by AUL. 256 In July 2013, Governor Rick Perry signed into law both parts of HB 2. 257 The following September, a group of abortion providers sought the facial invalidation of the admitting-privileges measure. 258 Although the district court enjoined enforcement of the law, the Fifth Circuit reversed only days later, and the admitting-privileges provision went into effect. 259 A week after the Fifth Circuit's decision, providers challenged the ambulatory-surgical-center provision and argued that the admittingprivileges provision was unconstitutional, at least as applied to facilities in McAllen and El Paso. 260 At trial, the parties stipulated that only seven facilities in major cities would be able to comply with the ASC provision. 261 Texas offered several expert witnesses in support of HB 2. 262 State witnesses claimed that the ASC provision was justified because any abortion required entry into the uterus, a matter best performed in sterile facilities like hospitals. 263 State witnesses reiterated that an admitting-privilege requirement would improve the credentialing of abortion providers and guarantee women better continuity of care. 264 Following the trial, the district court enjoined enforcement of the two provisions, and the Fifth Circuit again reversed. 265 Because that court had already rejected a challenge to the admitting-privilege regulation, the court held that the district court had directly violated the rule of res judicata. 266 Texas also argued that res judicata barred the challenge to the ASC requirement because the providers could have challenged it in 2013 and opted not to do so. 267 While holding that res judicata did stand in the way, the court nevertheless reached the merits of the challenge to the ASC restriction. 268 Concluding that the law ensured that women received only the best medical care, the court rejected any suggestion that the law was designed to restrict abortion access. 269 Nor, according to the Fifth Circuit, did the ASC measure have an impermissible effect under Casey. 270 The court found that even if the law would require seventeen percent of women in the state to travel 150 miles or more, that number was not high enough to satisfy the "large fraction" test set out in Casey. 271 men would struggle to obtain an abortion after HB 2, their problems came from their existing circumstances, not from HB 2. 272 When it came to the small number of ASCs currently operating in the state, the Fifth Circuit found that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of showing that ASCs could not expand and serve a larger clientele. 273 When the Supreme Court agreed to hear Whole Woman's Health, AUL and other antiabortion groups relied on Harris in defending HB 2. AUL compared HB 2 to a Louisiana statute, upheld by the Fifth Circuit, that exempted abortion providers from a state statute limiting medical practice liability. 274 According to AUL, the constitutionality of HB 2 and the Louisiana law flowed directly from Harris. 275 While Louisiana's law might make it impossible for providers to obtain liability insurance, providers did not face a state-created, formal obstacle. 276 Similarly, "any claimed inability of Plaintiffs to comply with the ambulatory surgical center requirement is not of the State's creation, and cannot be counted an 'undue burden.' " 277 An amicus brief on behalf of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and other antiabortion organizations made Harris and Maher the centerpiece of their defense of HB 2. 278 All of the reasons that it would be hard for clinics to comply with HB 2 had nothing to do with the government. 279 If "a private leasing opportunity fell through due to hostility to abortion" or "poverty makes it difficult for some women to obtain an abortion," the government could not be blamed. 280 The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops explained: "Casey only forbids an undue burden by the government on the decision whether to have an abortion." 281 Texas relied on Harris both in leaning on the right-privilege distinction and in justifying the singling out of objections to abortion. 282 Harris had made clear that " [a] bortion is inherently different from other medical procedures" and that the state had more latitude in sin- gling it out. 283 Moreover, Harris had announced a formalist approach that legitimized laws that did not "burden" the abortion decision, regardless of their actual impact. 284 If HB 2 made it harder for women to get abortions, the government was not at fault. 285 "The State here has no due-process (or equal-protection) obligation to affirmatively subsidize abortion," Texas contended. 286 Texas and sympathetic antiabortion groups described Casey's undue burden test as an extension of Maher and Harris. Casey prohibited laws that created an undue burden, but Texas argued that when discerning whether such a burden existed, courts should look no further than the surface of a law. The undue burden test required this kind of formalism, ignoring any question about the real-world impact of a statute.
Decided in June 2016, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Hellerstedt that rejected the logic used by Texas and its allies in the antiabortion movement. Writing for a 5-3 majority, Justice Stephen Breyer dedicated much of his opinion to the issue of res judicata, rejecting the Fifth Circuit's analysis as to both parts of the Texas law. 287 Justice Breyer then took up the most divisive question in the case: what Casey's undue burden test actually required. 288 The Court first took issue with the Fifth Circuit's conclusions about the purpose of the law. 289 The Fifth Circuit had reasoned that if Texas claimed that a law benefitted women's health, the courts should defer to that judgment rather than take an independent look at the medical evidence. 290 The Court rejected this conclusion, explaining: "The rule announced in Casey . . . requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer." 291 Nor did the Court find convincing the argument that legislators alone should determine the impact of a law. 292 Styling a law a benefit or a burden did not determine the outcome of the undue burden analysis, and lawmakers' conclusion that a law helped women did not resolve the issue. 293 weight upon evidence and argument presented in judicial proceedings," Justice Breyer explained. 294 The majority offered a few additional clues about the undue burden test involved in its analysis of both Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court's most recent abortion decision before Hellerstedt. 295 As his majority in Hellerstedt included the author of Carhart, Justice Anthony Kennedy, Justice Breyer carefully explained how Carhart had already performed the balancing detailed in Hellerstedt. 296 While acknowledging that Carhart seemed to require deferential review of legislative fact-finding, Justice Breyer reasoned that Carhart did nothing to change the Court's "constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake." 297 According to the majority, Carhart had weighed Congress's findings on dilation-and-extraction abortion against record evidence that conflicted with lawmakers' conclusions. Thoughtful analysis, not "uncritical deference," was the hallmark of Carhart. 298 Breyer maintained that Casey had also balanced the burdens and benefits of a spousal-notification and parental-involvement law, relying "heavily on the District Court's factual findings and the researchbased submissions of amici in declaring a portion of the [spousal-notification measure] unconstitutional." 299 As Breyer described it, the undue burden test required a similarly thorough consideration of any legislative findings, as well as evidence in the record, particularly expert testimony. 300 The Court's application of the undue burden test was also revealing. First, the Court rejected a formalist approach to analysis of HB 2's benefits. 301 Carefully reviewing the record evidence, the Court found no proof that the admitting-privileges requirement would improve health outcomes for women. 302 When it came to the effect of the admitting-privileges law, the Court attributed the closure of most of the clinics in the state to HB 2, notwithstanding the fact that the law's sting depended partly on surrounding circumstances that the state did not control. 303 The Court acknowledged that many hospitals would not grant clinics admitting privileges for reasons outside the power of the government, including requirements that an "applicant has treated a high number of patients in the hospital setting in the past 294 year, clinical data requirements, [or] residency requirements." 304 Nevertheless, when HB 2 interacted with these background factors, a significant number of women lost access to abortion services. 305 Nor did it change the Court's analysis that the problems women encountered after HB 2 resulted partly from other factors outside the government's control. The Court insisted that HB 2 would create an undue burden by ensuring that women confronted "fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding." 306 That women faced more expense, inconvenience, and lost access stemmed partly from factors unrelated to HB 2, including a woman's economic status or place of residence. 307 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that the realworld impact of HB 2 was the same as a regulation that more formally restricted abortion. 308 The Court's analysis of the ASC provision was also in tension with the formalism of Harris and Maher. In those cases, the Government claimed (and the Court accepted with little question) that the law encouraged childbirth over abortion. By contrast, in Hellerstedt, the Court did not accept at face value the argument that the ASC provision guaranteed better outcomes for women. 309 After looking at the record evidence, the Court instead reasoned that the regulation had no tangible health benefit at all. 310 In assessing the effect of the ASC regulation, the Court emphasized that existing facilities might not be able to accommodate the demand that would arise if more clinics closed. 311 Moreover, the majority suggested that HB2 would create an undue burden even if ASCs could serve more patients. 312 "Patients seeking these services [would be] less likely to get the kind of individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support that doctors at less taxed facilities may have offered," the Court explained. 313 Hellerstedt attracted attention because it rejected the idea that the undue burden standard was no different than rational basis review. By putting teeth in the standard, Hellerstedt ensured that more abortion regulations were constitutionally questionable. However, as this Part argues next, the transformation of the undue burden standard may be particularly relevant to potential challenges to the Hyde Amendment and to the very distinction between negative and positive rights. 
B. Reexamining the Hyde Amendment
Hellerstedt casts doubt on the constitutionality of core justifications for the Hyde Amendment and laws like it, including those involving private-insurance coverage for abortion. Hellerstedt first requires a consideration of the benefit achieved by a law-something that must be established using tangible record evidence. 314 The purposes set forth for the Hyde Amendment have varied, but three command the most attention. First, supporters of the bill echoed the claim made in Maher and Harris that the Hyde Amendment was designed to encourage childbirth rather than abortion. 315 Second, proponents emphasized that the Amendment vindicated the complicity-based objections of those who believed that paying tax to support abortion would violate their conscience. 316 Finally, some proponents of the Hyde Amendment have presented it as a cost-saving mechanism, emphasizing that budgetary constraints limit what kind of services the state can guarantee. 317 None of these purposes would obviously fare well under Hellerstedt. States may argue that Hellerstedt applies only to laws involving the protection of women's health, not to fetal-protective laws like the Hyde Amendment. However, this argument fails based on the reasoning of Hellerstedt itself. The majority emphasized that the balancing approach had already applied to fetal-protective laws, including those in Casey and Carhart. 318 The Court has not clearly indicated that Hellerstedt will apply to woman-centered laws like HB 2. 319 How would Hellerstedt deal with the purposes set forth for the Hyde Amendment? First, there is no compelling evidence that the Hyde Amendment actually encourages more women to carry pregnancies to term. Starting in 1981, studies have suggested that the Amendment discouraged relatively few women-roughly four to six percent-from terminating their pregnancies. 320 Research suggests instead that the Hyde Amendment has shifted the expense of abortions for poor women from the public to the private sector, placing a financial burden on poor women themselves or on abortion provid- ers. 321 The evidence on state funding restrictions suggests a similarly modest effect: a 1.9-2.4% increase in reported live births. 322 While the Hyde Amendment may have resulted in some increase in the number of women carrying pregnancies to term, it is far from clear that the effect has been significant. Nor is it even obvious that increasing the number of live births would qualify as the same kind of obvious benefit set out by Texas in Hellerstedt. Those on opposing sides of the abortion conflict would agree that making abortion safer for women is desirable. The same consensus would not apply to the idea that an increase in live births is always better, regardless of the underlying circumstances of a woman carrying a pregnancy to term.
What about the interest in protecting the conscience-based objections of taxpayers who disapprove of abortions? To be sure, the Hyde Amendment sends a message that taxpayer monies will not fund Medicaid abortions. However, the impact of the Amendment is more attenuated, particularly if it is framed as protection for those who feel that they have wrongly been forced to support abortion. The recent push to deny any state and federal funding for organizations that perform abortions relies on the idea that taxpayers are still wrongly obligated to subsidize abortions. 323 A recent Forbes study estimated that taxpayers subsidize roughly twenty-four percent of the annual costs of abortions, but the majority of the burden falls on state taxpayers, a group unaffected by the Hyde Amendment. 324 The Amendment cannot remove any indirect subsidy for abortion or assure those who define their complicity in idiosyncratic or unusually broad ways. As a result, the Hyde Amendment is not a particularly effective way of guaranteeing that no taxpayer feels complicit in abortion.
Even the evidence on the cost-saving benefits of the Hyde Amendment is somewhat dubious. Supporters of the Hyde Amendment point to the relatively high cost of an abortion procedure, particularly after the first trimester. 325 Even if the Amendment has led to only modest reductions in the abortion rate, that reduction could mean significant savings for taxpayers. 326 However, any savings may be more than offset by added costs. Research indicates that Medicaid recipients seeking to terminate a pregnancy have to make painful financial choices, often putting off bills for food, rent, and other necessities to assemble adequate funds for abortion. 327 In turn, these delays tend to only increase the cost of an abortion, particularly after the second trimester begins. 328 As the cost of a procedure increases, the financial burden on poor women also climbs, suggesting that the Hyde Amendment requires more women to seek supplementary forms of public assistance, particularly if they are unable to end a pregnancy. 329 Even if a court found some evidence that the Hyde Amendment achieved its stated goals, it would be hard for defenders of the law to maintain that those benefits outweigh the Amendment's costs. Opponents of the Hyde Amendment point to several kinds of burdens created by the law: delays in obtaining access to abortion, additional financial strain, and practical obstacles to receiving any abortion whatsoever. 330 Abortion opponents once successfully defended the Hyde Amendment against these charges in two ways. First, the Amendment's proponents insisted that these burdens result not from the Hyde Amendment but from women's personal circumstances. 331 If a woman requires time to put together the money for an abortion, her limited financial circumstances cannot be blamed on the state. Similarly, if she fails to find adequate funds and has to carry a pregnancy to term, her difficult financial situation cannot be traced back to a state law.
A related argument might suggest that any burden created by the Hyde Amendment is not onerous enough to raise constitutional concerns. 332 If a law like the Amendment merely creates delays or increased expenses for women seeking abortions, the argument goes, that alone would not create an undue burden. After all, the twentyfour-hour waiting period upheld in Casey increased expense, travel times, and delays for women, particularly poor, young, and nonwhite women, but the Supreme Court nevertheless upheld it. 333 Hellerstedt raises questions about whether either of these defenses will remain convincing. First consider the argument that the burdens created by the Hyde Amendment result from a woman's poverty rather than from state intervention. The Hellerstedt Court explicitly rejected this logic as applied to HB 2. 334 Texas and AUL both argued that clinics could not comply with HB 2 for reasons having nothing to do with the state, including the reasons that hospitals chose to grant admitting privileges, the resources available to clinics seeking to expand their capacity or comply with ASC regulations, and the place of residence of women seeking abortions. 335 The majority found this claim unpersuasive. 336 In tracing the effect of the law, the Court considered how HB 2 intersected with existing political, financial, and medical trends rather than analyzing the law in isolation. 337 The fact that hospitals often refused to grant abortion providers admitting privileges because of low admission rates from clinics did nothing to undermine the challenge to HB 2. 338 Ac-cording to the Court, the law was unconstitutional because of its interaction with other factors shaping access to abortion care. 339 The same reasoning applies to the Hyde Amendment. The Amendment devastates poor women neither because they are poor nor because the law, on its face, creates formal sanctions. Instead, the interplay between the Amendment and poor women's financial struggles creates the kind of delays and increased health risks so often highlighted by the Amendment's critics. Hellerstedt departs from existing precedent by looking beyond the text of a law to its impact in the real world. Such an analysis would make it much harder to justify the Hyde Amendment.
The second justification for the Hyde Amendment-that any burden it creates is minimal-may not hold up well under Hellerstedt. The Court defined constitutionally problematic burdens far more broadly than the ones laid out in Casey. 340 Hellerstedt dignifies increased expenses, long travel distances, and delays in access as burdens that matter under Casey. 341 Indeed, the Court suggests that a law might create an undue burden if it guarantees that women will receive a lower quality of care, even if the procedure remains available. 342 Hellerstedt might also spell trouble for recent laws that expand on the Hyde Amendment model. Recently, abortion opponents have pushed model legislation based on AUL's Abortion Coverage Prohibition Act, a law that would prohibit private insurance plans from covering abortion. 343 Some variations of the law, like one passed by Michigan, allow consumers to purchase an "abortion rider" with an additional premium. 344 Ten states have passed laws blocking abortion coverage in any private insurance plan, while an additional twentyfive prohibit abortion coverage in any policy offered through insurance exchanges. 345 Even the theoretical availability of abortion riders may mean very little, given that only a limited number of insurers make them available. 346 The defense of these laws relies heavily on Maher and Harris. Much like Medicaid prohibitions, insurance bans do not prevent women from obtaining abortion care; any obstacle stems instead from the market price of abortion and women's personal financial circumstances. 347 Hellerstedt makes this argument less effective. The Court defines a broader category of cognizable burdens, including delays, increased costs, and a decline in the quality of services. 348 The kind of increased expense or obstacle to access created by insurance-coverage bills-totaling hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars-seems no less serious than the travel distances, delays, or declines in personalized care emphasized by Hellerstedt. The Court's recent decision also makes it much harder to rely on the funding cases in defending an insurance ban. The defense of insurance bans also invokes the claim that a woman's inability to pay for an abortion without insurance stems from factors outside the control of the government. 349 But in Hellerstedt, the Court found no merit in this argument. 350 When explaining why HB 2 had an impermissible effect, the Court emphasized how the law interacted with hospital policies, market prices, and providers' budgets. 351 Insurance bans promise to limit access to abortion in similar ways. While the state may not have a say about which private insurance plans offer abortion riders, an insurance ban would sharply increase the costs of abortion for many women partly because such riders are rarely available. HB 2 also troubled the Court because it created a perfect storm-one based on the details of the law, the financial circumstances of clinics in the state, and the nature of hospital admitting policies. Michigan's recent insurance restriction could have a similar effect: the paucity of insurance riders and the rising costs of abortion could put the procedure out of reach for many women.
Hellerstedt may also create problems for those defending state and federal proposals to defund care providers, like Planned Parenthood, that also offer abortion services. Starting in 2015, twenty-four states passed such laws. Of those twenty-four, seventeen would prevent family-planning organizations from receiving Medicaid reimbursement for other services if they performed or advocated abortions; fourteen introduced such a ban regarding state family-planning funding, and an additional ten blocked such organizations from receiving other state monies, including those for sexually transmitted-infection or breastcancer testing. 352 While the courts have sometimes enjoined enforcement of these laws, 353 they still represent an important part of antiabortion strategy.
The case state lawmakers make for these laws relies heavily on Harris and Maher. In advocating for its recent defunding law, for example, Ohio stressed that "state legislatures have 'wide latitude in choosing among competing demands for limited public funds.' " 354 The challenge to such laws generally relies on the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, arguing that such laws impermissibly condition receipt of a benefit on the surrender of the right to abortion or free speech. 355 When this argument has fallen short, courts have often relied on the idea, drawn from Maher and Harris, that "a federal subsidy program is fundamentally different from 'direct state interference' with a particular activity." 356 Even laws excluding abortion providers from laws limiting malpractice liability seem less constitutionally acceptable after Hellerstedt. Louisiana passed a law in 2010 that prohibited doctors from receiving medical-malpractice insurance if they performed elective abortions. 357 The Fifth Circuit looked to the funding cases in upholding the law: those seeking to refuse service to same-sex couples, challenge the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act, or defend new abortion restrictions.
The battle for the Hyde Amendment also helped to create a constitutional right-privilege distinction that has had considerable influence ever since. Supporters of the Hyde Amendment revived the distinction and gave it more doctrinal heft, urging the courts to ignore burdens not formally created by state law.
Hellerstedt has put both the Hyde Amendment and the right-privilege distinction on shakier ground. The Court's decision requires proof that a law actually delivers on the promises of its sponsors-a requirement that may be hard to meet for those relying on cost saving, discouraging abortion, or protecting conscience-based objections. Hellerstedt also upends the Court's analysis of what counts as an impermissible constitutional effect. Far from ordering a court to disregard the background circumstances and to focus on the formal text of a law, Hellerstedt makes those circumstances a central part of Casey's undue burden analysis. The Hyde Amendment has been a prominent feature of American constitutional jurisprudence for decades, but the outcome of an attack on it may now be as realistic as it is important.
